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Lamb's Chapel v. CenterMoriches
Union Free School District:
AN

END TO

RELIGIOUS APARTHEID

Jay Alan Sekulow*
Keith A. Fournier**
John D. Etheriedge* **
"The communists are in, the atheists are in, the agnostics are in, but religion's out
because we don't like their viewpoint .. .."'

This statement typifies government sentiment toward the religious perspective
in the marketplace. The Supreme Court, however, has long recognized that religious speech is protected under the First Amendment. 2 Further, the Supreme
Court has taught that the government carries a heavy burden to justify any
content-based restrictions imposed upon protected expression.' In fact, the
Supreme Court has held that content-based censorship will be, in all but the most
exceptional circumstances, inevitably unconstitutional:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.
...The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control ...
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose
views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or
more controversial views. . . . Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be
based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone. 4

Despite clear direction from the Court, religious speakers seeking access to
government fora otherwise open for expressive activity have repeatedly been subjected to discriminatory treatment. Sadly, the perception of some government

* Chief Counsel, the American Center for Law and Justice, Virginia Beach, Virginia; and, the Founder of
Christian Advocates Serving Evangelism, Atlanta, Georgia. Presented oral argument for the church in Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993), and for the students in Board of Educ.

v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
** Executive Director, the American Center forLaw and Justice, Virginia Beach, Virginia. Co-Counsel in
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993).
*** Staff Counsel, the American Center for Law and Justice, Virginia Beach, Virginia.
1.Oral Argument Transcript at 62, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct.
2141 (1993) (No. 91-2024).
2. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981) ("[R]eligious worship and discussion ... are forms of
speech and association protected by the First Amendment.") (citing Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948)).
3. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
4. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (citations omitted).
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officials seems to be that religion and the religious perspective are unfit for public
communication. The New York Attorney General, in his brief for Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,' argued fervently that the suppression of private religious speakers advances the public good, stating, "[rieligious
advocacy . . . serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents and yields a
benefit only to those who already believe." 6
From the denial of equal access rights for Bible clubs7 and the use of government facilities for religious purposes,' to the prohibition of distribution of free religious literature and the communication of religious ideas in general, 9
anti-religious bigotry has yet to cease.
On June 7, 1993, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Lamb's
Chapelv. CenterMoriches Union Free School District.10 The Supreme Court unanimously determined that viewpoint-based speech restrictions, religious or otherwise, are unconstitutional even in a nonpublic forum. 1 ' In so doing, the Lamb's
Chapel Court, without question, confirmed that government hostility toward religion and the religious perspective will not be tolerated. The Court's holding, one
of the most significant in recent years, 12 has far-reaching implications.
5. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
6. Brief for Respondent Attorney General at 24, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024). Justice Scalia expressed concern over the Attorney General's position in a brief discussion with Mr. Hoefling, Counsel for the Center
Moriches School District, at oral argument:
Question: Mr. HoeflingMr. Hoefling: Yes, Your Honor.
Question: This-this may be a little unfair because it's really not your brief, but you-you are here representing both respondents, I-I gather, in this argument, and the Attorney General of New York, in his
brief defending the - the New York rule says that - I'm quoting, "Religious advocacy serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents and yields a benefit only to those who already believe."
Does New York State - I grew up in New York State and in those days they - they used to have a tax
exemption for religious property. Is that still there?
Mr. Hoefling: Yes, Your Honor, it still is.
Question: But they've changed their view, apparently, that Mr. Hoefling: Well, Your HonorQuestion: You see- it used to be thought that-that religion- it didn't matter what religion, but it- some
code of morality always went with it and it was thought that, you know, what was called a God-fearing
person might be less likely to mug me and rape my sister. That apparently is not the view of New York
anymore.
Mr. Hoefling: Well, I'm not sure that that's-thatQuestion: Has this new regime worked very well?
(Laughter.)
Oral Argument Transcript at 53-54, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024).
7. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
8. Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist., 941 F.2d 45 (1st Cir. 1991); Gregoire v.
Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 899 (1990); Concerned Women for Am.,
Inc. v. Lafayette County, 883 F2d 32 (5th Cir. 1989); Shumway v. Albany County Sch. Dist., 826 F Supp. 1320
(D. Wyo. 1993).
9. Friedmann v. Sheldon Community Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist.,
821 F. Supp. 638(D. Idaho 1993); Nelsonv. MolineSch. Dist., 725 F. Supp. 965 (C.D. Ill. 1989); Riverav. East
Otero Sch. Dist., 721 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989); Thompson v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp.
1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
10. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
11. Id.
12. Lamb' Chapel is the Court's first decision squarely addressing the issue of viewpoint-based discrimina-
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This Article is divided into three parts. Part I explores the blatant hostility toward religion that has permeated government decisions regarding access to the
supposed "free marketplace of ideas.""3 Part II examines the Supreme Court's recent landmark decision in Lamb' Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District,14 and the clear mandate of the Court against further disparate treatment of
religious speakers and the religious perspective in the public square. Finally, Part
III addresses the implications of the Lamb's Chapel opinion, both independently
and in conjunction with other significant decisions.
I.

THE HOSTILITY FACTOR

A. Denials of EqualAccess and the
Use of Government Facilities
As previously noted, government regulation of speech must be contentneutral.1 " If the government creates a forum for speech, it cannot selectively exclude speakers based solely upon the message they wish to communicate. The
principle is simple and completely neutral with respect to all expression. Unfortunately, however, government entities have often been led astray by undifferentiated fear of the Establishment Clause.15
Properly understood, the Establishment Clause is a limitation on the power of
government. It is not a restriction on the rights of individuals acting on their own
behalf according to the dictates of their conscience. As the Supreme Court has
stated, "there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." 7
An excessive preoccupation with avoiding any form of government "support"
for religion has led many to focus improperly upon the location of speech rather
than upon the identity of the speaker.18 As a result, government entities often end
up actively discriminating against religious speech by excluding it from otherwise
open public fora. Private religious speech, however, is protected against viewpoint discrimination regardless of the nature of the forum. Further, any benefit
that may enure to a religious speaker obtaining access to public property on an
equal basis with other speakers is purely incidental and thus, does not violate the
Establishment Clause. 19

13. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 519 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 596 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14. 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993).
15. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
16. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion. . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
17. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
18. This fact was acknowledged and further discussed in Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of
Silence: The EqualStatus of Religious Speech By PrivateSpeakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 1,9-13 (1986) [hereinafter
Laycock].
19. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (does not violate the Establishment
Clause to grant religious expression a benefit which is otherwise generally available).
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As the Supreme Court has held," '[t]he Establishment Clause does not license
government to treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of
their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore subject to
unique disabilities.' "20
Government entities have yet to grasp this reality, however, and have consistently exhibited animosity toward religious speakers. The Supreme Court first addressed this misguided government hostility more than a decade ago in Widmar v.
Vincent. 2

1. Widmar v. Vincent
The University of Missouri formally encouraged the formation of voluntary
student organizations and freely opened its facilities for use by such groups.2 In
January, 1977, however, the University refused to grant Cornerstone, one of the
more than one hundred registered student organizations on campus, access to a
meeting room .23 The University based the denial on the fact that Cornerstone's
meetings included Bible teaching and an "atmosphere" of worship.24 University
regulations prohibited the use of University buildings or grounds for "religious
teaching" or "religious worship" by both students and non-students.2
Cornerstone challenged the constitutionality of the regulation and the
University's denial of equal access in federal district court. 26 The University defended on the basis that the regulation and the specific denial of equal access to

20. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring
in judgment)). In fact, any regulation which is not facially neutral and which targets religious expression for special disabilities violates the Free Exercise Clause. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.
Ct. 2217 (1993).
21. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
22. Id.
23. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 909-10 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
24. Id.
25. The regulation provided, in relevant part:" 'No university buildings or grounds ... may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by either student or non-student groups.' "Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 265 n.3 (1981).
26. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
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Cornerstone were compelled by the strict "separation of church and state" 27 demanded by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Missouri
Constitution. 28 Persuaded by the mesmerizing metaphor, 29 the district court held
that any violation of Cornerstone's First Amendment rights was justified by the
principles of separation required by the Establishment Clause and the Missouri
Constitution.3 The district court had no difficulty with the fact that its ruling effectively diminished religious expression to a form of second class speech, entitled
to less protection than other speech.3 1
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in favor of Cornerstone, holding
the content-based restriction on free speech unjustified by either the requirements
of the Establishment Clause or the Missouri Constitution. 2 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed. 3
The Supreme Court held that religious discussion and worship "are forms of
speech and association protected by the First Amendment."34 The Court further
held that the University of Missouri had created an "open" forum for students and
faculty in its facilities. 3" Having done so, any restrictions on speech must necessarily be content-neutral. 3 Regarding the University's contention that the
Establishment Clause compelled the disparate treatment of religious speech on the

27. The metaphor coined by Thomas Jefferson in his famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association has
become almost synonymous with an absolute separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause. See
Richard H. Jones, Accommodationist and SeparationistIdealsin Supreme Court Establishment ClauseDecisions,
28 J. CHURCH & ST. 193, 193-200 (1986) (According to the separationist perspective, the Establishment Clause
demands the creation of"a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.") (citing Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)). Unfortunately, Jefferson's metaphor is one
of the few constants in the confused and incoherent doctrine of the Establishment Clause. See Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a
mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been expressly
freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years."). The text of Jefferson's letter stated, in relevant part:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach action
only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Members of the Danbury Baptist Association in Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802),
reprintedin SAUL K. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERsON 518-19 (1943).

28. Mo. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 7; art. IX, § 8.
29. See Laycock, supra note 18, at 27 ("[Tlhe separation metaphor has been the basis of repeated efforts to
censor religiously motivated speech.").
30. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907,918 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
31. Id.
32. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980).
33. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
34. Id. at 269.
35. A government body creates an "open" forum for free speech when it opens government facilities to general
use by the public or some segment of the public. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983). The University of Missouri policy authorized use of its facilities by more than one hundred registered student groups for "political, cultural, educational, social and recreational events." Widnar, 635 F.2d at
1312.
36. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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campus, the Supreme Court stated, "[w]e agree that the interest of the University
in complying with its constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does not follow, however, that an 'equal access' policy would be incompatible with this Court's Establishment Clause cases."3 7
Thus, two principles emerged from the Court's decision in Widmar. First, religious worship and discussion are protected under the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment. 38 Second, the Establishment Clause does not conflict in any
way with a policy of equal access under which the conducting of religious meetings is treated without reference to its content. 9
2. The Companion Cases to Lamb's Chapel
The problems faced by the religious speakers in Widmar have not been an
anomaly. In fact, three circuit courts have addressed the issue of religious speakers in public facilities." As these three cases show, the hostility to the religious
speaker in the public forum has been pervasive.
In Concerned Women for America, Inc. v. Lafayette County,41 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals was faced with the denial of a request by the local Concerned
Women for America [hereinafter CWA] Prayer Chapter for use of the Lafayette
County and Oxford Public Library auditorium.42 By regular practice, the auditorium was available on a first-come, first-served basis to anyone requesting its use,
provided such use was not for a religious or political purpose.' a Pursuant to this

37. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271. The Establishment Clause requires government neutrality andforbids government hostility toward religion. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (The Establishment Clause
"affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any."); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (The principal effect of government action must not "inhibit" religion.). Thus, "equal access" is required by the Establishment Clause because "if a State refused to let
religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion." Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,248 (1990).
38. The Court specifically rejected the notion raised in Justice White's sole dissent that religious worship is
somehow distinct from other religious speech, and, therefore, deserving of less protection under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70 n.6.
Justice White has since altered his view on this issue as evidenced by his majority opinion in Lambs Chapel
which, on free speech grounds, upheld the church's right to use school district facilities for an admittedly "religious purpose." See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,2142-49 (1993).
39. The Widmar Court specifically reserved judgment on whether the principles of equal access apply with
equal force to students in public secondary schools. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 275-76. But see the discussion of
Mergens and the Equal Access Act, infra notes 88-106 and accompanying text.
40. See Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist., 941 F.2d 45 (1st Cir. 1991); Gregoire v.
Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 899 (1990); Concerned Women for Am.,
Inc. v. Lafayette County, 883 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1989).
41. 883 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1989).
42. Id. at 33.
43. Id. The library's written policy provided that the auditorium was:
[Olpen for use of groups or organizations of a civic, cultural or educational character, but not for social
gatherings, entertaining, dramatic productions, money-raising, or commercial purposes. It is also not
available for meetings for social, political, partisan or religious purposes ....

19931

AN END TO RELIGIOUSAPARTHEID

practice, CWA's request was denied because it was determined that "CWA was a
group with religious purposes. " "
The Fifth Circuit, agreeing with the district court, held that the library had created a designated open forum and therefore could not discriminate against potential users based solely upon the content of their speech, regardless of whether such
speech was religious."
Similarly, in Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine School Administrative
District,4" the First Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a school district's denial
of a church's request to use school facilities for the purpose of giving a free
Christmas community dinner.47 The policy and practice of the school district,
based on its view of the Establishment Clause, was to grant use of its facilities to
any group, provided "they [did] not seek to propagate or propound a religious
message."' Denial of the church's request was grounded upon the fact that "the
dinner was to be accompanied by an evangelical message."4 9 The court concluded
that such an exclusion is an "elementary violation" of the freedom of speech, stating, "[p]rivate citizens can freely choose the recipients of their benefactions; the
50
state has restrictions. One of these is the First Amendment.
Finally, in Gregoire v. Centennial School District,51 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that permitting a religious organization to rent public school facilities for a religious purpose does not violate the Establishment Clause.52 Specifically, Student Venture, a Christian youth organization, sought permission to use
the local high school auditorium 53 for a performance by magician Andre Kole."
The school's denial was predicated on the fact that the show was religious. s The
school district argued that the denial was compelled by the Establishment
Clause.56
Student Venture sought relief in federal district court, and the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania ruled that Centennial had created a designated open forum by
renting to a wide range of community groups and issued an injunction restraining

44. Id. at 34. Typically, CWA meetings consisted of prayer and discussion on political and family issues from
a Biblical perspective. Id. at 33-34.
45. Id. at 34-35. The court further noted that principles of equal access do not offend the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 35.
46. 941 F.2d 45 (lst Cir. 1991).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 46.
49. Id.
50./d. at 48.
51. 907 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 899 (1990).
52. Id.
53. Centennial School District had rented its facilities to a wide variety of community groups. Id. at 1369. By
written policy, however, the school district prohibited use of its facilities for "religious services, instruction, and/
or religious activities." Id.
54. Id. The performance was to take place on a Saturday evening. Id. During intermission, Mr. Kole planned
to offer "an account of his investigation of the miracles of Christ and how his discovery that Jesus Christ was who
he claimed to be changed the course of [his] life." Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1379.
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the school district from discriminating against applicants based upon the content
of their message."
On cross-appeals to the Third Circuit, the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's injunction, finding that the school district had created an open forum, thus
requiring equal access, and that Student Venture's use of the auditorium would not
violate the Establishment Clause. 8
In each of these cases, the courts conducted a forum analysis and concluded that
the government entity had created a designated open forum in its facilities for
after-hours use. 9 In the absence of a compelling state interest,"0 government officials could not discriminate against potential users based solely upon the content
of their speech, regardless of whether such speech was religious.61 Further, the argument advanced by the government, which suggested that granting religious
speech access to the forum would violate the Establishment Clause, was rejected
in each instance.62
B. The Special "School Context"
Nowhere is blatant government hostility toward religion more clearly evidenced
than in the public schools.
1. The School Prayer Cases
The Supreme Court has closely scrutinized activities in the public school context for compliance with the Establishment Clause, leaving most school officials
on edge and extremely fearful of the dreaded "wall of separation between church
and state."63 Of particular significance are three cases often referred to as the

57. Id. at 1369. Subsequently, Student Venture filed a Motion for Clarification, seeking to amend the injunction to enjoin the school district from prohibiting "religious worship" and to bar the school district from interfering with the peaceful distribution of religious literature. Id. at 1370. The district court denied the group's motion.
Id.
58. Id. at 1369. The Third Circuit further concluded that "religious worship" and the distribution of religious
literature are protected speech and remanded the case back to the district court with instruction to expand the
injunction to enjoin the school district from prohibiting religious worship or the distribution of religious literature. Id. at 1383.
59. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
60. The most common interest offered by government officials is avoidance of an Establishment Clause transgression. Repeatedly, however, the interest has been ruled insufficient to justify discrimination against private
religious speech. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247-53 (1990) (plurality), 260-62 (concurrence);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-76 (1981); Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist.,
941 F.2d 45, 48 n.6 (Ist Cir. 1991); Gregoire,907 F.2d at 1382 n. 14 ("While we have.., applied strict scrutiny
analysis to the facts before us, we are by no means convinced that the reasons advanced by [the school district] fur
excluding [the religious group] could withstand review even under a rational basis standard."); Concerned
Women for Am., Inc. v. Lafayette County, 883 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1989).
61. GraceBible Fellowship, 941 F2d at 47-48; Gregoire, 907 F.2d at 1378-82; Concerned Women, 883 F.2d at
34-35.
62. See supr notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
63. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Court's "School Prayer" decisions: Engel v. Vitale,64 School District of Abington v.
Schempp ,65 and Stone v. Graham."
In Engel v. Vitale, 7 the Court addressed the constitutionality of a daily procedure, mandated by the State of New York, whereby each public school class was
68
required, at the direction of school officials, to recite a state-composed prayer.
The Court held that the state regulation violated the Establishment Clause. Specifically, the Court stated that "it is no part of the business of government to compose
official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government." 9
Similarly, in SchoolDistrictofAbington v. Schempp,7" the Supreme Court struck
down, as violative of the Establishment Clause, state action requiringthe reading
of the Holy Bible and recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the beginning of each
school day.71 The Schempp Court found it of particular significance that these exercises were (1) conducted on school property with direct supervision and participation by government-employed teachers, and (2) "prescribed as part of the
curricular activities of students who [were] required by law to attend school."72
Fear that religious discussion or discourse must be removed from the classroom
is unfounded. In fact, the Court in Schempp emphasized:
It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic
qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not
be effected consistently with the First Amendment. 73
Finally, Stone v. Graham74 involved a Kentucky state statute which required the
posting of the Ten Commandments in every public school classroom.75 The United
States Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the
Establishment Clause.76

64. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
65. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
66. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
67. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
68. The prayer was as follows: " 'Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg
Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.' "Id. at 422. The prayer was recited at the
beginning of each school day, immediately following the pledge of allegiance. Id. at 1271 (Douglas, J., concurring). A teacher led the prayer or selected a student to do so. Id. at 438.
69. Id. at 425.
70. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
71. Id. at 223.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 225.
74. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
75. The statute provided, in part:
(1) It shall be the duty of the superintendent of public instruction, provided sufficient funds are available
... to ensure that a durable, permanent copy of the Ten Commandments shall be displayed on a wall in
each public elementary and secondary school classroom in the Commonwealth.
Id. at 39-40 n. 1 (citing Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (Baldwin 1980)).
76. The Graham Court, however, reiterated the fact that "the Bible may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like." Id. at 42.
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As a result of these early cases, many school officials have reacted with hostility toward private expression of religious views in the public schools. The
Supreme Court's "School Prayer" cases, 77 however, as noted above, have focused
on active government control and involvement in religion and religious exercise in
the schools. 78 Despite this fact, school officials have aggressively censored private
student speech endorsing religion or religious perspectives. This is particularly
surprising in light of the Supreme Court's clear pronouncement concerning 79students' rights in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.
2. Students Do Not Leave Their Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme
Court addressed the rights of students to express themselves in the public schools.
The students in Tinker were suspended from school for wearing black armbands in
a symbolic protest against the Vietnam War.8 Expressing concern about the controversial nature of the students' message and fear of potential school disruption,
that schools were an inappropriate place for the students' expresofficials argued
81
activity.
sive
The Supreme Court sharply responded by stating "[i]t can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this
Court for almost 50 years." 82 The Court emphasized that "[w]hen [a student] is in
the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized
hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects."83
The Tinker Court held that school administrators may only prohibit protected
student speech when it "materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."' As Justice Fortas
noted:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as
well as out of school are "persons" under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State. In our system, students may not be regarded as

77. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (state-required posting of the Ten Commandments); School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (school-mandated prayer and Bible reading); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school-directed prayer).
78. James M. Smart, Jr., Widmar v. Vincent and the Purposesofthe EstablishmentClause, 9 J.C. & U.L. 469,
471 nn. 11-12 (1982-83) (and footnote) [hereinafter Smart]. "The [Supreme] Court has never found the
Establishment Clause to be applicable in restricting the religious activities of private individuals regardless of
whether such activities are conducted on public property." Id. at 473.
79. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
80. Id.at 504.
81. Id. at 508-10.
82. Id. at 506.
83. Id. at 512-13.
84. Id. at 509. The Court specifically noted that "inour system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Id. at 508.
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closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate. They
may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views. As
Judge Gewin, speaking for the Fifth Circuit, said, school officials cannot suppress
"expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to contend." 85

Thus, there can be no question that students possess broad free speech rights in
the public schools.8 6 Their right to express themselves, even on controversial matters, is guaranteed, provided such expression does not "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school.""

3. Mergens and the Equal Access Act
In 1984, Congress passed the Equal Access Act' to cure the pervasive antireligious bigotry exhibited by public secondary schools in the aftermath of the
Supreme Court's School Prayer cases. The Act made it unlawful:
[Flor any public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and
which has a limited open forum[ 90] to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or
discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited
open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of
the speech at such meetings. 9'

Unfortunately, the Act was held hostage for almost six years, until the Supreme
Court finally declared it constitutional in Board ofEducation v. Mergens.92
At issue in Mergens was whether student-initiated Bible Clubs are entitled to
equal treatment and equal access in public secondary schools.93 The Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act and ruled, pursuant to
the Act, that public secondary schools that receive federal funds and allow

85. Id.at 511.
86. It is important to note that the Court's holding in Tinker did not depend on the forum status of the school.
Whether or not a school campus constitutes a public forum for outsiders, it is clear that the students who are required to attend, and are lawfully attending school, have the protection of the First Amendment Free Speech
guarantees. See Laycock, supra note 18, at 48.
87. Tinker v.Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
88. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988).
89. S.REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2357.
[School officials] have even prohibited students from praying together in a car in a school parking lot,
sitting together in groups of two or more to discuss religious themes, and carrying their personal Bibles
on school property. Individual students have been forbidden to say a blessing over their lunch or recite the
rosary silently on a school bus.
S.RE,. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1984), reprinted in1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2357-58.
90. According to the Act, a "limited open forum" is defined as follows: "A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related
student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time." 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (b) (1988).
91.20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
92. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
93. Id.at 231.
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non-curriculum related clubs94 to meet on campus must allow student-initiated
Bible Clubs to meet on campus during non-instructional time and grant them official recognition." The Court further explained that "[o]fficial recognition allows
student clubs to be part of the student activities program and carries with it access
to the school newspaper, bulletin boards, the public address system, and the annual Club Fair."96
The Mergens Court responded forcefully to Establishment Clause arguments
raised against the Act and in defense of exclusion of the Bible Club, stating, "there
is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." 97 The Court went on to hold that
a policy of equal access for religious speech conveys a message "of neutrality
rather than endorsement; [in fact,] if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion." 8 The Court also emphasized that a policy of equal access "would
in fact avoid entanglement with religion." 99

94. The Mergens Court held that noncurriculum related groups are those not "directly-related" to the school
curriculum. Id. at 239-40. The Court went on to state that:
In our view, a student group directly relates to a school's curriculum if the subject matter of the group is
actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a regularly offered course; if the subject matter of the group
concerns the body of courses as a whole; if participation in the group is required for a particular course;
or if participation in the group results in academic credit. We think this limited definition of groups that
directly relate to the curriculum is a commonsense interpretation of the Act that is consistent with Congress' intent to provide a low threshold for triggering the Act's requirements.
Id.
95. Id. at 239-40, 247.
96. Id. at 247.
97. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990). The Court was unpersuaded by the government's
argument that the school atmosphere provides a "ready-made audience for student evangelists." Id. at 249-50. In
fact, the right to persuade, advocate, or evangelize a religious viewpoint implicates the very reason the First
Amendment was adopted. As the Supreme Court held in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945),
[t]he protection [the Framers] sought was not solely for persons in intellectual pursuits. It extends to more
than abstract discussion, unrelated to action. The First Amendment is a charter for government, not for
an institution of learning. "Free trade in ideas" means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action,
not merely to describe facts.
Id. at 537.
The nature of public schools does not justify the forfeiture of constitutional fights. Rather, the public nature of
such schools enhances the constitutional rights of students. The school is the best place to teach students how the
laws of the land apply.
98. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248.
99. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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4. Problem Areas
With the combined force of the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Tinker and
Mergens, it is difficult to imagine the source of any government justification for
the disparate treatment of peaceful religious student expression. Unfortunately,
school officials have persisted in their discriminatory conduct.
Under the guise of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lee v. Weisman,1"' for example, government officials and school administrators have issued mandates prohibiting all prayer at public school graduations.' As a result, valedictorians,
salutatorians, and other designated student speakers have been forbidden to discuss their religious views or offer any religious sentiment in their graduation
speeches.10 2
Even beyond the graduation context, voluntary student prayer has generated
immense hostility from government administrators. For instance, police officials
called to one school physically assaulted a student for voluntarily praying on the
school campus with other like-minded students before the commencement of the
official school day in recognition of the "See You at the Pole" National Day of
Prayer.' Specifically, police officers, with the assistance of school officials,
threatened students with tear gas if they did not cease praying on school property. " When students refused to surrender their cherished constitutional rights,
officials physically wrenched students' hands from one another, took them into
custody, and removed them from the school campus in a police car. 0 '
Further, students have battled repeatedly with school officials to obtain recognition of their rights to distribute religious literature,'0 6 wear t-shirts with religious messages, and even to bring their Bibles to school.
II. Lamb's ChapelAND THE RELIGIOUS HOSTILITY FACTOR
Against this backdrop, Center Moriches Union Free School District proceeded
to encroach upon the rights of Lamb's Chapel Church.

100. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (holding that it violates the Establishment Clause for school officials to invite
clergy to give prayers at commencement).
101. See, e.g., Shumway v. Albany County Sch. Dist., 826 F Supp. 1320 (D. Wyo. 1993) (discussing the letter
opinion issued by the Wyoming Attorney General's Office).
102. See Friedmann v. Sheldon Community Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1993) (vacating preliminary
injunction enjoining student prayers at commencement); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., No. 93-833-Civ-J- 10
(M.D. Fla. June 10, 1993) (denying preliminary injunction against student-initiated prayers at graduation ceremonies); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist., 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993) (post-Lee decision upholding the rights of
students to initiate prayers at graduation).
103. "See You at the Pole" is a student-initiated, student-led national prayer event which takes place on school
campuses across the nation one day each September, prior to the commencement of the official school day. Students gather with like-minded peers to pray for their friends, teachers, administrators, and the nation.
104. See Complaint at 10, Newberry v. Short, No. 92-4198JLF (S.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1992).
105. Id. at 10-11.
106. See, e.g., Nelson v. Moline Sch. Dist., 725 F. Supp. 965 (C.D. Ill. 1989); Rivera v. East Otero Sch. Dist.,
721 F Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989); Thompson v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa.
1987).
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A. Background of the Case
New York state law authorizes the use of public school facilities for, inter alia,
"holding social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other
uses pertaining to the welfare of the community" provided that "such meetings,
entertainment and uses shall be non-exclusive and shall be open to the general
public."" 7 Pursuant to that statute, Center Moriches Union Free School District
[hereinafter Center Moriches] adopted official rules governing community use of
school district facilities which permitted "social, civic, or recreational use" when
"non-exclusive and open to all residents of the school district that form a homogeneous group deemed relevant to the event."" 8 Not surprisingly, however, Center
Moriches' official rules expressly forbade use of school premises "by any group for
religious purposes.""'
Pastor John Steigerwald and Lamb's Chapel Church [collectively hereinafter
Lamb's Chapel] applied on two separate occasions for permission to use school facilities for the showing of a film series about family issues, entitled, Turn Your
Heart Toward Home. 110 In both instances, Center Moriches denied Lamb's
Chapel's requested use because of the religious content of the film. 11
By longstanding practice, Center Moriches had opened its facilities to a wide
variety of uses." 2 In fact, the only applications for use of its facilities that Center
Moriches had ever denied were those of Lamb's Chapel.1' 3 Further, Center
Moriches had previously granted access to a number of organizations for the purpose of engaging in expression concerning precisely the same topics Lamb's
Chapel would have addressed in the film, Turn Your Heart Toward Home.114
Whether based upon a misunderstanding of the Establishment Clause or a forbidden animosity toward religion, 1 ' it is difficult to imagine a more fundamental

107. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 414(1)(c) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992).
108. Rules and Regulations for Community Use of School Facilities [hereinafter Rules & Regs.] #10,
Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 57a, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113
S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (No. 91-2024). Center Moriches also permitted use by "political organizations." Rules &
Regs. #8, Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 57a, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024).
109. Rules & Regs. #7, Appendix to Petition fbrWrit of Certiorari at 57a, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024).
110. The film series was in six parts, hosted by Dr. James Dobson, "a licensed psychologist, former associate
clinical professor ofpediatrics at the University of Southern California, best-selling author, and radio commentator." Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 2144. The film series discussed "Dr. Dobson's views on the undermining influences of the media that could only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian family values
instilled at an early stage." Id.
11. Id. at 2144-45. Specifically, the school district stated that "[t]his film does appear to be church related and
therefore your request must be refused." Id. at 2145; see also Joint Appendix at 84, 92, Lamb's Chapel (No. 912024).
112. Only a partial listing of school uses from 1987 to 1990 revealed more than 955 uses of Center Moriches'
facilities by no less than 80 different groups. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 3, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024); see also
Joint Appendix at 27-69, 100-09, 139-48, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024).
113. Petitioners' Brief at 8, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024).
114. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 4-5, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024).
115. The Establishment Clause requires government neutrality and forbids government hostility toward religion. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,673 (1984) (The Establishment Clause "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (the principal effect of government action must not "inhibit" religion).

1993]

AN END TO RELIGIOUS APARTHEID

deprivation of guaranteed First Amendment liberties than that wrought by the policy and practice of Center Moriches. The deprivation could not have been more
egregious had the school district opened its doors for discussion of the Civil War,
but banned the African-American perspective.
Freely admitting the religious nature and purpose of its requested use, Lamb's
Chapel challenged the denial of equal access to Center Moriches' facilities." 6
Lamb's Chapel brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York on February 9, 1990, seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief. 117
Despite the fact that it had opened its facilities for use by the community for an
exceptionally broad variety of uses, Center Moriches argued that it had not created an "open forum";"I8 that the denial of Lamb's Chapel's request to use school
facilities was compelled by both state law and school district policy; and that to
permit Lamb's Chapel access to school facilities to show the film, Turn Your Heart
Toward Home, would violate the Establishment Clause." 9
The district court sided with Center Moriches and denied Lamb's Chapel's motion for declaratory and injunctive relief on May 16, 1990.12 Specifically, the
court determined that Center Moriches had not created an open forum. 12' Rather,
the court held that "by enforcing restrictions on access imposed by state statute and
by its regulations, the School District. . . created [a] limited public forum[]."122
The court stated that, unlike an open forum, "limited public forum" access "can be
restricted by reasonable and viewpoint-neutral regulations."' 23 The court concluded, using circular reasoning, that Center Moriches had equally prohibited all

116. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 736 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
117. Specifically, Lamb's Chapel sought a preliminary injunction to compel Center Moriches to grant Lamb's
Chapel's requested use of school facilities and restrain Center Moriches from further discriminating against applicants based on the religious content of their speech. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
959 F.2d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1992). In addition, Lamb's Chapel sought declaratory relief confirming that
Center Moriches had created an "open forum" in its facilities and had engaged in unconstitutional content-based
discrimination against Lamb's Chapel and its religious speech. Id. Lamb's Chapel requested a further declaration
that Center Moriches had violated Lamb's Chapel's federal constitutional rights of free speech, association,
equal protection, and free exercise, and had violated the Establishment Clause. Id. See also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 6-7, Lambs Chapel (No. 91-2024).
118. The Supreme Court has identified "three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). Traditional public fora include property, such as public streets and parks, traditionally open to assembly and debate. Id. Designated or "open" public fora are facilities "not traditionally open to
assembly and debate as a public forum" which government has "intentionally openled]. . . for public discourse."
Id. Examples of designated public fora include university facilities made available for meetings of student groups,
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), municipal theaters made available for private dramatic productions,
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), and school board meetings opened for citizen
input, Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
Nonpublic fora comprise property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication,
Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983), such as jailhouse grounds,
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
119. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 736 F. Supp. 1247, 1250 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
120. Id. at 1248.
121. Id. at 1251.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1252 (citations omitted).
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organizations from using school facilities for religious purposes, and, thus, Center
Moriches' denial of Lamb's Chapel's requested use was viewpoint-neutral and
constitutionally justified.12 4
Lamb's Chapel appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit,12 which on March 18, 1992, affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment."12 The Second Circuit incorrectly held that public property may
be divided into three types of fora: the "traditional public forum," the "purposefully opened forum," and the "non-public forum."127 The court determined that
"the school property in question falls within the subcategory of 'limited public forum'[12 8] the classification that allows it to remain non-public except as to specified uses."129 The court ruled that Center Moriches had, by state law and local
rule, specifically excluded religious speech from the list of permitted uses.130
Thus, Lamb's Chapel could gain access to school facilities only if Center Moriches
had, by practice, opened its facilities to religious uses and purposes in the past.131
Although it stated that "[w]hether Center Moriches has opened its facilities to religious uses and purposes presents a close question," the court concluded that none
of the prior uses of Center Moriches' facilities were "religious in any meaningful
way."1 32 The court, therefore, found no basis for any of the claims presented by
Lamb's Chapel.
133
Lamb's Chapel petitioned to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" and heard argument on February 24,

124. Id. at1253-54.
125. This was the second time Lamb's Chapel appealed to the Second Circuit. Lamb's Chapel had previously
appealed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 770 R Supp. 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). The appeal was withdrawn, however, at the suggestion of Staff Counsel for the Second Circuit, and Lamb's Chapel returned to the
district court to obtain a final disposition of the case and to afford the district court an opportunity to reconsider
its decision in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). Id.
at 92.
The district court distinguished the Mergens opinion and, relying substantially upon its prior findings, granted
summary judgment in favor of Center Moriches on July 15, 1991. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist.,
770 F Supp. 91 (E.D.N.Y.1991).
126. Lamb's Chapel v.Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992).
127. Id. at385-86.
128. More specifically, the court defined a "limited public forum" as a subcategory of the "purposefully
opened" or "designated" fbrum inwhich, according to the Second Circuit, "property remains anonpublic forum
as to all unspecified uses .... and exclusion of uses -even ifbased upon subject matter or the speaker's identity -need only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral to pass constitutional muster." Id. at 387 (quoting Deeper
Life Christian Fellowship v. Board of Educ., 852 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1988)).
129. Id. at 386 (citing DeeperLife, 852 F.2d at 679 (where the Second Circuit adopted state court interpretation
of N.Y. Educ. Law § 414 that use of New York school facilities is confined to nonreligious purposes)).
130. Id. at383.
131. According to the Second Circuit, 'in a limited public forum, government is free to impose a blanket exclusion on certain types of speech, but once it allows expressive activities of a certain genre, it may not selectively
of that genre." Id. at387 (quoting Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927
deny access forother activities
F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991)).
132. Id. at387-88.
133. Lamb's Chapel v.Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 51 (1992).
134. Id.
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1993.135 A decision was issued in favor of Lamb's Chapel, reversing the Second
Circuit, on June 7, 1993.136
B. The Supreme Court's Opinion
1. Justice White's Majority Opinion
The Court first examined Lamb's Chapel's argument that Center Moriches had
created a designated open forum in its facilities, such that any subject matter or
speaker exclusions were required to be justified by a compelling state interest and
narrowly tailored to achieve that end. 137 The record demonstrated that Center
Moriches' written policy regarding the use of its facilities authorized "social,
civic, or recreational uses," as well as use by political organizations.13 8 Further,
Center Moriches permitted more than 955 uses of its facilities by more than eighty
different groups in less than three years.139 The Court, however, reserved judgment on this issue, because Center Moriches' denial of Lamb's Chapel's requested
use was plagued by a much more fundamental error.14
The Court determined that Center Moriches' denial of Lamb's Chapel's requested use did not survive constitutional scrutiny even under the most lenient
standard - reasonableness.14 1 Among the multitude of groups to whom Center
Moriches had granted access to its facilities were at least four who had engaged in
expression concerning the exact same topic142 Lamb's Chapel would have

135. Id.
136. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993).
137. Id. at 2146. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
138. Lamb' Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144. N.Y. Educ. Law § 414 authorized the use of public school facilities
for,
inter alia, "holding social, civic, and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to
the welfare of the community." N.Y. Eouc. LAw §414(l)(c) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992). This is effectively
the same range of activity provided by the policy that was found to establish a designated open forum in Widmar.
See Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1312 (8th Cir. 1980) ("political, cultural, educational, social and recreational").
139. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 3, Lamb' Chapel (No. 91-2024). See also Joint Appendix at 27-69, 100-09,
139-48, Lambs Chapel (No. 91-2024).
140. The Court did state that Lamb's Chapel's "[forum] argument has considerable force," suggesting quite
strongly that a policy or practice similar in nature to that of Center Moriches would, without more, create a designated open forum for expressive activity. Lambs Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 2146-47. This argument is further bolstered by the fact that at least three circuits have determined that even narrower policies create a designated open
forum and a right to equal access for religious speakers. Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine Sch. Admin.
Dist., 941 F.2d 45 (1 st Cir. 1991) (youth groups, community civic and service organizations, government agencies, educational programs, athletic or recreational activities, and cultural events); Gregoire v. Centennial Sch.
Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1372-73 (3d Cir.) ("civic, cultural and service organizations," "labor unions," for-profit
"plays" and "musical performances," and adult education or college classes), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 899 (1990);
Concerned Women for
Am., Inc. v. Lafayette County, 883 F.2d 32, 33 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[o]pen for use of groups
or organizations of a civic, cultural or educational character, but not for social gatherings, entertaining, dramatic
productions, money-raising, or commercial purposes [or for] meetings for social, political, partisan or religious
purposes.").
141. Lamb' Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147. This level of scrutiny is typically employed when examining speech
restrictions in a nonpublic forum and only requires that the restriction be viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in
light of the purpose served. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
142. The film, Turn Your Heart Toward Home, addresses family issues and child-rearing from a religious perspective. Lambs Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144-45.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGELA WREVIEW

[Vol. 14:27

addressed in the film, Turn Your Heart Toward Home. " The Court reasoned that
Lamb's Chapel was denied its requested use solely because of the religious viewpoint of its message 1" and declared that "denial on that basis was plainly invalid." 4 Justice White firmly stated "[tihe principle that has emerged from our
cases 'is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in
ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.' "146
Regarding Center Moriches' argument that the Establishment Clause compelled the denial of Lamb's Chapel's application for use of school facilities, the Court
stated, "[w]e have no more trouble than did the Widmar Court in disposing of the
claimed defense ... "147 This is hardly surprising since the Supreme Court had
already ruled definitively that the Establishment Clause presents no bar to a policy
of equal access to public school facilities.' As previously noted, "there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech49endorsing religion, which the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."1
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, but wrote separately to voice his
continuing displeasure with the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine, including
5
the majority's "unsettling and unnecessary" citation of Lemon v. Kurtzman. 1 1
3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence 1 '
Justice Scalia clarified one matter left open by the majority -the continuing viability of New York's overreaching Education Law section 414. Specifically,
Justice Scalia argued that section 414 is effectively invalidated by the Court's decision "to the extent it compelled the District's denial" of Lamb's Chapel's requested

143. Center Moriches had previously granted access to these groups on a number of different occasions for
activities relating to "family issues": Family Counseling Service, a division of the Hampton Council of Churches;
Center Moriches Parent Teacher Association, which used school facilities to discuss many topics relating to family issues; Helping Every Living Person, a non-profit organization dedicated to strengthening families; Special
Education Parent Teacher Association, which used school facilities to discuss many topics relating to special education children and their families. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 4-5, Lamb' Chapel(No. 91-2024).
144. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at2147.
the First
145. Id. The Court pointed to the fact that it had previously held that " 'the government violates
Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise
includible subject.' "Id. at 2147 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806). See also City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
146. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 2147-48 (quoting Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804).
147. Id. at 2148. Despite Justice Scalia's colorful objection, Justice White invoked the Lemon test. Id. The majority, however, summarily concluded that permitting school property, used by a wide variety of private organizations, to be used after-hours for the exhibition of a film with a religious perspective would not violate the
Establishment Clause under Lemon. Id.
148. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247-53 (1990) (plurality), 260-62 (concurrence); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-76 (1981).
149. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250.
150. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
concurring).
151. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and was joined by Justice Thomas. Id. (Scalia, J.,
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use.' 52 His conclusion is only logical. If it were not so, then the Court's decision
would have meant nothing. All facts the same, Center Moriches would simply be
permitted to deny Lamb's Chapel's use again, claiming that section 414 compelled
its action.
In dramatic fashion, Justice Scalia expressed his lack of respect for the Court's
Establishment Clause doctrine and particularly the infamous Lemon test.15 3 As
with the ill-conceived "wall of separation" metaphor, Justice Scalia recognized
that the Lemon test has spawned significant fear and hostility while offering
little
15 4
assistance in the complex maze of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
III. IMPLICATIONS

A. EqualAccess Is Mandated Where the Government Has
Created an Open Forumfor Expressive Activity
Clearly, the principles of equal access are well-established after Lamb's Chapel.
When a governmental body, by policy or practice, makes its facilities available for
general use by the public, or a segment of the public, it may not selectively exclude
users on the basis of the religious content of their speech or activities. "'
The Lamb's Chapel Court declared that there was "considerable force" behind
the argument that Center Moriches had created an open forum for expressive activity. 5 6 The Court withheld judgment on the issue, because the school district's
egregious viewpoint discrimination was unconstitutional regardless of the nature
of the forum. 7 It is quite clear, however, that any government entity with a policy
or practice of facility use similar to that of Center Moriches will be found to have

152. Id.
153. Id. The Supreme Court announced a three-part Establishment Clause test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), whereby challenged government practices must: (1) have a "secular legislative purpose"; (2)
have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster "an excessive entanglement with religion." Id. at 612-13.
154. Justice Scalia's remarks, though humorous, bear repeating for their truth:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again,
frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District....
Over the years, however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions,
personally driven pencils through the creature's heart (the author of today's opinion repeatedly), and a
sixth has joined an opinion doing so.
The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our
audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to return to the tomb at will ....
When we
wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it. . . when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we
ignore it entirely. . . . Sometimes, we take a middle course, calling its three prongs "no more than helpful signposts,".. . . Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a somnolent
state; one never knows when one might need him.
Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149-50 (Scalia, J., concurring).
155. The fact that a request involves an expressly religious purpose, including worship, does not alter the government's duty not to discriminate in an open forum.
156. Lambs Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2146.
157. Id. at 2147.
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created a designated open forum. ' For instance, the Widmar Court found that the
University of Missouri had created an open forum in its facilities for students by
granting access to "political, cultural, educational, social and recreational"
uses. 5 9 The Widmar policy covered effectively the same range of activity specified in Center Moriches' policy. Further, other courts have determined that even
narrower policies create designated open fora and a right to equal access for religious speakers. "
1. Lamb's Chapel's Effect on the Use of Government Facilities by Religious
Speakers
The ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision in Lamb's Chapelare significant. No longer can religious expression be censored in the public arena just because the government says so.
a. Privately Sponsored Displays with a Religious Message
Lamb's Chapelaffirms the fact that privately sponsored displays in public parks
and other fora opened for expressive activity are constitutional. 16' The fact that a
particular display is religious will not justify government censorship. 62
' Decisions
like that of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Chabad-Lubavitchof Georgia
v. Miller, 63 and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Doe v. Small,'64 are in
accord with the principles dictated by the Supreme Court in Lamb's Chapel.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held, in Chabad-Lubavitchof
Georgia v. Millerthat

158. By policy, Center Moriches made its facilities available for "social, civic, and recreational" uses. Lambs
Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2146. By practice, the only use the school district ever denied was that of Lamb's Chapel.
Petitioners' Brief at 8, Lamb's Chapel (No. 91-2024).
159. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1312 (8th Cir. 1980).
160. See, e.g., Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist., 941 F.2d 45 (1st Cir. 1991) (youth
groups, community civic and service organizations, government agencies, educational programs, athletic or
recreational activities, and cultural events); Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1372-73 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 899 (1990) ("civic, cultural and service organizations," "labor unions," for-profit
"plays" and "musical performances," and adult education or college classes); Concerned Women fbr Am., Inc. v.
Lafayette County, 883 F.2d 32, 33 (5th Cir. 1989) ("open for use of groups or organizations of a civic, cultural or
educational character, but not far social gatherings, entertaining, dramatic productions, money-raising, or commercial purposes [or for] meetings for social, political, partisan or religious purposes"). See also Shumway v.
Albany County Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Wyo. 1993) (holding that local school district could not deny
access to its facilities to a group sponsoring a private baccalaureate service) (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993)).
161. See generally Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
162. See Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, No. 92-8008, 1993 WL 409604 (11th Cir. Oct. 18,1993) (citing
Lamb's Chapel for the proposition that there is no violation of the Establishment Clause when the government
grants a private organization permission to erect a religious display in a designated open forum located inside the
State Capitol Building); see also Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 988 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1993) (There is no constitutional violation where a city permits a "private, overtly religious holiday display" in a public park.); Americans
United for Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538 (6th Cir. 1992) (erection of
privately-funded religious holiday display in a traditional public forum does not violate the Establishment
Clause); Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992) (erection of private religious display in a public park does
not violate the Establishment Clause).
163. No. 92-8008, 1993 WL 409604 (11 th Cir. Oct. 18, 1993).
164. 964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992).
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[plart of the majesty of the public forum is that it insulates the government from the
necessity of scrutinizing the content of the citizenry's speech. Through a broad policy of content-neutral inclusion, the public forum is uniquely situated to avoid the
need for the State to make religion-based exclusionary judgments and therefore risk
unconstitutional entanglement with religion."' 5

At issue in Chabad, was the constitutionality of a private organization's request
to erect a Chanukah menorah"' display in the Georgia Capitol Rotunda.1 67 Noting
that "Georgia has opened the Rotunda to Georgia's citizenry for their expressive
activities both secular and religious in nature,"168 the court of appeals held that
"[i]n a true public forum, such as the Rotunda, the Establishment Clause cannot be
used as a justification for content-based restrictions on religious speech." 6 9 The
Chabadcourt, citing Lamb's Chapel, correctly recognized that
[b]y permitting religious speech in a public forum -whether in the heart of a core
government building, in the Georgia Governor's mansion, or in the outer reaches of
some state-owned pasture-the state simply does not endorse, but rather acts in a
strictly neutral manner toward, private speech.170

Thus, "[a]ny perceived endorsement of religion in a true public forum is simply
misperception .. ..""' It is not the responsibility of the private speaker, however, to dispel any such misperception, if in fact it exists. Rather, "[i]f the state is
concerned that those who hear or view the private religious speech may not appreciate the strictly private nature of the speech, the state has the burden of informing
the public that speech in a public forum does not enjoy state endorsement."172

165. Chabad, 1993 WL 409604, at *5.
166. The Chanukah menorah is "a nine-pronged candelabrum, the principle symbol of [a] Jewish holiday."
Chabad, 1993 WL 409604, at *12 n.1.
167. "The Rotunda is an open space under the dome in the center of the Capitol Building." Id. at *2.
Chabad had requested permission from the State to erect the menorah in the Rotunda forthe duration of the
Chanukah season. Id. Georgia officials refused to grant Chabad's request, and the group sought relief from the
Federal District Court far the Northern District of Georgia. Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Harris, 752 F Supp.
1063 (N.D. Ga. 1990). The district court concluded that the State's Establishment Clause concerns justified its
denial of Chabad's request. Id. Chabad appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. ChabadLubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 976 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir. 1992). A petition for rehearing en banc, however, was
granted. Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 988 F.2d 1563 (11 th Cir. 1993).
168. Chabad, 1993 WL 409604, at *2.
169. Id. at *10.
170. Id. at *8. Other circuits have similarly acknowledged this basic principle. See Kreisner v. City of San
Diego, 988 F2d 883, 895 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The public forum doctrine would be rendered meaningless if only
places in the middle of nowhere could be free speech areas, and if all speech that occurred near 'structural symbols of government' had to be viewed as governmental speech."); Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 630 (7th Cir.
1992) ("That a public forum may be close to city hall cannot matter; any fbrum open to secular speech must be
open to religious speech.").
171. Chabad, 1993 WL 409604, at *9.
172. Id. The ChabadCourt expressed caution, however, stating:
We have grave doubts whether, under circumstances like those in this case, a state may post signs in front
of only some displays, or beside only certain speakers. Such a practice might permit the state to treat
speech differently within the public forum based on the content of the speech. Disclaiming endorsement
of only certain speech may suggest approval of non-disclaimed speech, all contrary to the nature of a public forum.
Id. at *12 n.18.
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In Doe v. Small, 173 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of a private display of sixteen canvases depicting scenes from the life of
Christ erected in a public park in Ottawa, Illinois. 174 Noting, as did the Chabad
court, that the Supreme Court has held that the Establishment Clause is not a sufficiently compelling government interest to justify content-based restriction even
in a designated open forum, the Doe court held that "[government] may not exclude privatepersonsfrom [a public park] merely because ofthe religiouscontent of
their speech. ,17' The Doe court went on to state that
[b]ecause the First Amendment mandates that the government permit religious
speech in quintessential public forums, the mere
presence of religious symbols in
176
such a forum cannot violate the Constitution.
The Seventh Circuit correctly concluded that:
[the government] must treat all who wish to engage in expressive activities within the

confines of the law in [public parks] (andotherpublicforums)equally[, regardless of
the viewpoint or perspective of the message communicated]. 177
b. Privately Sponsored Baccalaureate Services
Students, community groups, and churches are entitled to sponsor events, such
as baccalaureate services. If school facilities are available to the community for
use, these groups must be allowed to use school facilities also, regardless of the
religious nature of their activities.
In Shumway v. Albany County School District,178 the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming recently issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the denial of equal access to school facilities for a private baccalaureate service. 179 Citing Lamb's Chapel, the Shumway court held that when the school
district "changed its existing policy [of open access to the community] to exclude
use of school facilities by groups with a religious purpose, the [school district] engaged in unconstitutional conduct and abridged the baccalaureate group's first
amendment rights in a manner not permitted by the law." 8 '
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama also
granted a preliminary injunction, in Verbena United Methodist Church v. Chilton

173. 964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992).
174. Id. at 612-13. Following an initial challenge of the religious display, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois issued an injunction enjoining the city from permitting anyone to display the religious paintings in the public park. Doe v. Small, 726 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1989). The court of appeals affirmed. Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1991). A petition for rehearing en banc, however, was granted.
Doe v. Small, 947 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1991).
175. Doe, 964 F.2d at 619.
176. Id. at 620-21. The Doe court recognized the "crucial difference" between government speech endorsing
religion and private speech endorsing religion. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
177. Doe,964 F.2d at 621.
178. Shumway v. Albany County Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Wyo. 1993).
179. Id.
180. Id.at 1327.
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County Board of Education,181 compelling a local school board to rent its high
school gymnasium to a private group for the purpose of holding a baccalaureate
service. 182
B. Viewpoint DiscriminationIs Unconstitutional
Even in a Nonpublic Forum
The Lamb's Chapel Court has made one thing very clear: Under no circumstance will the type of wholesale anti-religious bigotry perpetrated by the Center
Moriches School District be tolerated. The religious perspective on any issue 18is3
valuable to society and worthy of the full protections of the First Amendment.
Whether it is a leaflet expressing a religious view on abortion, a valedictorian
communicating the significance of God in his high school career, or a child singing
a religious rap song in the school talent show, no justification exists for religious
viewpoint-based discrimination even in a nonpublic forum.
1. Lamb's Chapel's Effect on Student-Initiated Commencement Prayers
With respect to student commencement speeches, school administrators have
failed to understand that the Supreme Court, in Lee v. Weisman,'84 held only that it
violates the Establishment Clause for school officials - arms of the government to invite clergy to give prayers at commencement. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Lee majority, made it very clear that the Court's decision was limited to the particular facts before the Court. 8 I Further, the Lee majority recognized that "at graduation time and throughout the course of the educational process, there will be
instances when religious values, religious practices, and religious persons will
have some interaction with the public schools and their students. " "'
Indeed, following Lee, at least one federal appellate court ruled that "a majority
of students can do what the State acting on its own cannot do to incorporate prayer
in public high school graduation ceremonies."' 87 In Jones v. Clear Creek
Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the

181. 765 F. Supp. 704 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
182. Id. See also Randall v. Pegan, 765 F Supp. 793 (WD.N.Y. 1991) (school district does not violate the
Establishment Clause when it rents its facilities to a group for a privately sponsored baccalaureate service).
183. Contrary to the argument made by the New York Attorney General in Lambs Chapel: "The First
Amendment assumes that the opportunity to discuss religious matters, and to be exposed to religious practices,
benefits each member of the community, just as the privilege of free speech benefits each one, even those having
nothing to say." Smart, supra note 78, at 478.
184. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
185. Id. at 2655.
186. Id. at 2661.
187. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. (Jones II), 977 F.2d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2950 (1993). Prior to the Lee decision, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the school board resolution permitting
prayer was constitutional. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist. (Jones 1), 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991). A
petition for certiorari was taken. Jones H, 977 F.2d at 965. Following the decision in Lee, the Supreme Court
remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit for reconsideration in light ofLee. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch.
Dist., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992). The Fifth Circuit, after reviewing Lee, determined that the school board resolution remained constitutional. Jones H, 977 F.2d at 965. On June 7, 1993, the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
allowing the Fifth Circuit's decision to stand in Jones I. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2950
(1993).
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constitutionality of a school board resolution permitting students to include a
student-led invocation in their graduation ceremony if the majority of the class so
votes. 188 The Jones Court recognized, as the Supreme Court has held, that "there is
a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the
1
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."

89

In Harris v. Joint School District,190 the United States District Court for the
District of Idaho also upheld the rights of students to initiate prayers at graduation
ceremonies, emphasizing the fact that
the Supreme Court is willing to tolerate some prayer at graduation ceremonies. The
Supreme Court has had two recent opportunities to ban all prayer at graduation ceremonies, but has declined to do so. First, in Lee, rather than emphasizing the need
for fact sensitivity, the Court could have stated that any prayer at public high school
graduation ceremonies violates the Constitution under any circumstances. But it did
not do so. Or, the Court could have required that separatebaccalaureate services be
held in place of including invocations and/or benedictions in official graduation ceremonies. But it did not choose to do so. And, secondly, in Jones II, rather than vacating the judgment and remanding that case to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Court could have directly addressed the appropriateness of senior students choosing
whether or not to have prayer at their public high school graduations. But it did not
choose to do so. 19 '

Students, without question, retain the right to initiate protected speech of their
choosing.192 As the Tinker Court held, school officials may not prohibit protected
student expression unless it "materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."1 3 Where students have been granted freedom to compose their own speeches, or even their
own commencement exercises, protected student expression should not be subjected to censorship because of its content or viewpoint. In fact, as Lamb's Chapel
and Widmar attest, it is a fundamental proposition of constitutional law that a government body may not suppress or exclude the speech of private parties for the
sole reason that the speech contains a religious perspective.
Arguments suggesting that commencement exercises are not public fora are irrelevant. First, as previously noted, the Court's holding in Tinker did not depend

188. Jones H, 977 F.2d at 972.
189. Id. at 969 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,250 (1990)). School officials must learn to
distinguish between refusing to directprayer or invite clergy to give prayer at graduation, and choosing to prohibit
individual student expression based on its content.
190. 821 F Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993).
191. Id. at 643 (citation omitted). It is important to note that the Supreme Court rejected yet another opportunity to declare any prayer at graduation unconstitutional when it recently denied certiorari in Jones I. Jones v.
Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
192. Government actors must learn that the Court meant what it said in Mergens: "[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, andprivatespeech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250.
193. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
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on the forum status of the school.1" 4 Rather, the Court declared that a student retains his free speech rights "[w]hen he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or
on the campus during the authorized hours.""9 ' Second, the Supreme Court's decision in Lamb's Chapelstands for the proposition that government may not prohibit
any expressive activity, regardless of the nature of the forum, based solely upon
the viewpoint of the message communicated.
2. Lamb's Chapel's Effect on Student-Initiated Prayer and Evangelism
The same principles apply when students choose to engage in voluntary studentinitiated, student-led prayer on school property; wear t-shirts with religious messages; bring Bibles or other religious texts to school; or distribute religious
' School officials cannot interfere unless the expressive acliterature on campus. 96
tivity materially or substantially disrupts school discipline.19 7
C. Religious Worship is Religious Speech
Any attempt to limit the scope of the Court's decision in Lamb's Chapel by distinguishing religious speech from religious worship is unavailing. The Supreme
Court has specifically held that both "religious discussion" and "religious worship" are protected speech under the First Amendment.19
The sole dissent in Widmar was authored by Justice White, 99 who argued that
religious speech and religious worship are two separate and distinct types of expression, one protected by the Free Speech Clause and the other protected by the
Free Exercise Clause.200 Thus, he contended that government should be free to exclude "religious worship," unprotected by the Free Speech Clause, from an otherwise open forum.2"1
The Widmar majority, holding that "religious worship" and "religious teaching"
are protected speech, correctly responded that such a distinction is devoid of any

194. Rivera v. East Otero Sch. Dist., 721 F Supp. 1189, 1193 (D. Colo. 1989) ("The holding in Tinker did not
depend upon a finding that the school was a public forum.").
195. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13.
196. The Supreme Court's consistent jurisprudence, for over fifty years, recognizes the free distribution of
literature as a form of protected expression. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640 (1981); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
Several courts have specifically held that student distribution of religious literature on public school campuses
is protected speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Nelson v. Moline Sch. Dist., 725 F. Supp.
965 (C.D. Ill. 1989); Rivera v. East Otero Sch. Dist., 721 F Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989); Thompson v.
Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
197. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); New Rider v. Board of Educ.,
414 U.S. 1097 (1973); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
198. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
199. It should be noted that Justice White also authored the majority opinion in Lamb's Chapel. Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2144 (1993). Justice White determined that the
denial of Lamb's Chapel's requested use was unconstitutional on free speech grounds, despite the fact that
Lamb's Chapel freely admitted that its request was for a "religious purpose." Id, at 2144.
200. See genemlly Widmar, 454 U.S. at 282-89.
201. Id. at 284.
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"intelligible content."2 "Worship" is an elusive concept to define. As one commentator has stated, "[a] sermon, a hymn, a scripture reading, or even a prayer,
will sometimes be worship and sometimes not, depending partly on close analysis
of its content, partly on the speaker's mental state, and partly on his theology."2"3
Further, assuming arguendo, that a definition could be found, government should
not be in the business of defining what is and what is not "worship." Certainly, the
government is not equipped to enter such a theological mine field. Any attempt to
do so would require close and intimate scrutiny of each requested activity to determine whether it was overly religious and qualified for the government-derived
definition of worship. Obviously, such a process would generate extensive entanglement problems. 20 4 In addition, religious speakers who sought use and were denied based on the supposed distinction would have a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause because of the unequal treatment among religious users.
1. Courts Have Not Sanctioned the Denial of Equal Access on the Ground That the
Requested Use Is for Religious Services
As previously discussed, Widmar upheld the use of university facilities for "religious worship."20 5 Further, Mergens and Lamb's Chapelboth involved the use of
government facilities for admittedly "religious purposes." 0 6 Thus, where a government entity has opened its facilities for use by the public, the fact that a requested use is for religious services or a religious purpose is not a valid
justification for denial.20 7
D. The Establishment Clause Is Not a ProperJustification
for Denial ofEqual Access and CertainlyNot for Any
Form of Viewpoint Discrimination
Despite the persistent attempts of government actors to justify their discriminatory conduct by reference to the Establishment Clause, it is clear that such arguments are misplaced. The Establishment Clause was never intended to be used as a
sword to justify the repression of religion.208

202. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70 n.6.
203. Laycock, supra note 18, at 56.
204. The Third Circuit in Gregoirealso rejected the distinction between religious discussion and worship, stating that "[aittempting to draw a line between religious discussion and worship would only exacerbate establishment clause concerns, requiring [the school district] to entangle itself in what would almost certainly be complex
content-determinations." Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 707 F.2d 1366, 1382 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 899 (1990).
205. See supra notes 22-39 and accompanying text.
206. See also Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist., 941 F.2d 45 (1st Cir. 1991); Gregoire
v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 899 (1990); Concerned Women for
Am., Inc. v. Lafayette County, 883 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1989).
207. See, e.g., Wallace v. Washoe County Sch. Dist., 818 F.Supp. 1346 (D. Nev. 1991) (school district required to rent district facilities to church for Sunday worship services where district had opened its facilities to a
wide variety of uses).
208. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (invalidating state statute
prohibiting ministers from serving as legislators).
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The Establishment Clause presents no bar to a policy of equal access to government facilities.2"9 In fact, the Establishment Clause requiresgovernment neutrality and forbids government hostility toward religion.2 10 Only a policy of equal
access avoids hostility and preserves neutrality toward religion.211 Thus, the
Establishment Clause actually mandates equal access to open fora for religious
speakers.
Viewpoint-based speech restrictions are even more egregious than contentbased discrimination." 2 As such, the Establishment Clause, which is an insufficient justification for denying equal access to religious speakers, could never
justify the type of anti-religious bigotry exhibited by Center Moriches.
IV. CONCLUSION

There is no question whether the Constitution demands that government grant
access to every type of government property for all of those wishing to engage in
expressive activity. It does not.2" 3 What it does require, however, is that government refrain from content-based discrimination where it has by tradition or designation opened a forum for free speech. Further, as the Lambs Chapel Court
emphasized, regardless of the nature of the forum, viewpoint-based restrictions
on speech, religious or otherwise, will not be tolerated. With the Supreme Court's
decision in Lamb's Chapel, religious apartheid has ended.

209. As the Supreme Court stated in Mergens, and as this Article has repeatedly emphasized, "there is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private
speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." Board of Educ. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
210. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (The Establishment Clause "affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (The principal effect of government action must not "inhibit" religion.).
211. "[I]f a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion." Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248.
212. Content-based restrictions may be constitutional where the government can demonstrate a sufficiently
compelling state interest, and the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve the particular interest. See Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). No provision is made, however, fir the justification of viewpointbased discrimination.
213. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800.

